The political-bureaucratic interface has been the subject of much academic interest. However, research has tended to focus exclusively on wealthy institutionalized democracies, with little attention given to the political-administrative relationship in developing countries. Evidence on reform processes in poorer nations increasingly points to the importance of interactions between politicians and bureaucrats. Drawing on this work, this paper provides a systematic overview of the political-bureaucratic relationship in developing countries. The paper makes two contributions. First, it introduces a typology of political-bureaucratic relations based on four modelscollaborative, collusive, intrusive, and integrated -and discusses examples of each.
Introduction
The political-bureaucratic interface has been the subject of much academic interest and debate going back to Woodrow Wilson's work on the characteristics of political and administrative spheres in 1887 (Peters and Pierre, 2001; Svara, 2006; Peters, 2010; Overeem, 2012; Jacobsen, 2006) . This debate centers on the respective roles of politicians and administrators in the policy process and the nature of the relationship between them. It has significant practical implications for policymaking, and as such, Bureaucratic autonomy is a key component of high-quality governance (Huntington, 2006) . As Fukuyama (2013: 359) notes, 'a high degree of autonomy is what permits innovation, experimentation and risk taking in the bureaucracy'. This innovation and experimentation has been central to the development process. Bureaucratic autonomy was essential to the transformation of the East Asian 'developmental states', such as South Korea and Singapore. Furthermore, excessive bureaucratic subordination is typically a key reason for poor or predatory governance (Evans, 1992) .
The difference between separation and autonomy is that the former refers to the types of functions politicians and bureaucrats perform, and the latter refers to how bureaucrats can perform the functions they have been assigned. Hence, while both integrated and collaborative models have a high degree of bureaucratic autonomy, they differ in terms of the types of functions politicians and bureaucrats perform. In the former, political leaders set the broad policy directives and civil servants provide policy options based on these directives and advise ministers on the feasibility, strengths, and weaknesses of the different policy options. Civil servants are also responsible for policy implementation. In the collaborative model, in contrast, senior bureaucrats are often responsible for the actual setting of policy directives.
It is important to point out that the typology presented is based on broad categorizations; the types of relations between politicians and administrators in reality is more blurred, often varying across levels of governance. As such, there are likely to be countries that do not precisely fit one of the four models presented. It is also important to note that the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is not fixed; these relationships change over time according to broader political and economic factors, or due to factors directly linked to a country's civil service. We discuss changes in political-bureaucratic relations following our discussion of the four basic models.
Collaborative Model
The collaborative model is characterized by low role separation between political and bureaucratic elites, with high levels of bureaucratic autonomy. It is particularly associated with developmental states -governments that actively promote socioeconomic development through market-oriented policies -such as the East Asian Tigers (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1992) , Botswana (Leftwich, 1995; Taylor, 2005) , and more recently China (Baek, 2005; Knight, 2014) . The close relationship between political and bureaucratic elites, together with the autonomy given to a highly skilled and meritocratic bureaucracy, is seen as central to the use of industrial policy in the developmental states that led to economic transformation (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1992; Leftwich, 1995) .
A key feature of the collaborative model is the unusually high degree of influence that bureaucrats have in the policy process. This has meant the successful use of industrial policy in these states is largely attributed to key economic ministries (Johnson, 1982) .
There are several fundamental characteristics of the collaborative model:
 Core group or 'cadre' of developmental elites consisting of senior politicians and bureaucrats.
 Unusually high degree of bureaucratic influence in proposal and design of policies.
 An esprit de corps among the political and bureaucratic elites based on development objectives. The collaborative model of political-bureaucratic relations associated with developmental states is noted for the presence of 'a small cadre of developmentallydetermined senior politicians and bureaucrats, usually close to the executive head of government', which establishes the principles of the regime (Leftwich, 1995: 405) .
The close working relationship between political and bureaucratic elites facilitates the unusually high degree of influence bureaucrats have in making policy in this system. Indeed, the bureaucracy in developmental states is often seen to have been in charge of the day-to-day running of the country. Politicians often act more like judges or referees, in that they tend to arbitrate and mediate in the policymaking process, rather than taking a more interventionist role (Charlton, 1991; Evans, 1992; Leftwich, 1995) .
It is, however, important to note that bureaucrats have this high degree of influence because the political leadership decides this should be the case (see Charlton, 1991) . In other words, the level of autonomy bureaucrats have is generally determined by the political leadership; there are very few examples of systems in which administrators dominate politicians.
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The close relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is fostered by a set of shared values and objectives that enables politicians to delegate far more responsibility to bureaucrats. The notion of an esprit de corps among politicians and bureaucrats based on achieving development objectives is a feature of virtually all accounts of developmental states (Wade, 1990; Charlton, 1991; Evans, 1992; Leftwich, 1995) . Rothstein (2015) discusses this in the context of China's 'cadre administration', where bureaucrats have high levels of commitment to the 'policy doctrine' of the bureaucracy.
3 In many developmental states, the similar class and/or higher education backgrounds of politicians and bureaucrats facilitated the development of an esprit de corps (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1992) .
In addition to these shared values, the bureaucracy is often subsumed within the dominant political party. 4 This means the bureaucracy in the collaborative model is not impartial or politically neutral, as per the Weberian ideal. Indeed, as Saxena describes in the case of Singapore following independence, the People's Action Party government, 'did not appreciate political neutrality; instead it expected the civil service to be aligned to its vision ' (2011: 38) . This politicized nature of the bureaucracy is further demonstrated by the frequent movement of senior bureaucrats into political office -a feature of most developmental states (Leftwich, 1995) .
Bureaucracies in the collaborative model have the Weberian characteristics of being coherent and meritocratic, which contributes to the high level of bureaucratic autonomy. Bureaucracies in developmental states are widely noted for being able to attract the country's best graduates. On entering the public administration these officials tend to adhere to the bureaucracy's established objectives, rules, and norms, with their career progression based on performance against these standards (Wade, 1990; Evans, 1992) .
Collusive Model
A close relationship between political and bureaucratic elites based on low role separation is also a feature of patrimonial or predatory states. However, in these countries, political-bureaucratic relations are based on a collusive model, where bureaucratic autonomy is low, and sometimes virtually non-existent. This collusive relationship fosters patronage networks used to extract rents. This can be seen in predatory states, such as Zimbabwe (Dashwood, 2000) . It is also associated with some more democratic countries, such as Mexico, where politics is dominated by a patronage system (Grindle, 2012) . There are several characteristics of the collusive model:
 Control of the state apparatus is vested in a small group of politicians and bureaucrats connected through personalistic ties.
 Those in key political and administrative positions have access to the major means of acquiring personal wealth in the country.
 The government bureaucracy is used primarily for rent-seeking purposes.
 Employment in the bureaucracy is based on loyalty to politicians leading to large and inefficient bureaucracies.
Much of the research on patrimonial states has focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, where 'overgrown' bureaucracies incorporated into rent-seeking governments and the pervasive corruption that follow are widely seen as a central cause of the postindependence economic stagnation across the continent (Bates, 1994) . This has frequently led to a focus on reducing the size of bureaucracies in the countries. The problem, however, is more to do with the lack of bureaucratic autonomy, as Evans (Grindle, 2012: 20) .
Intrusive Model
The intrusive model has a much higher degree of separation between political and administrative spheres than the previous two models. This is linked to the presence of more rule-of-law-oriented politically neutral bureaucracies -often established during colonial rule, as in the case of India. While there is high role separation between politicians and bureaucrats, levels of bureaucratic autonomy are often low due to political interference in the day-to-day work of civil servants. (Smith, 2009; Wallis, 1989; Riggs, 1963) . As such, the lack of bureaucratic autonomy in these contexts is often the result of power struggles between political and bureaucratic elites. Politicians have generally been able to assert their control over the civil service. This control often occurs through political interference in civil service recruitment and promotions, as Ayee (2013) discusses in the case of countries with intrusive political-bureaucratic relations have institutional checks in place to limit political interference in civil service recruitment and promotion, as we discuss in more detail below. This is an important difference between the intrusive and collusive model.
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Much of the research on bureaucracies in development focuses on the intrusive model. This research suggests that a key issue at the root of the tension between political leaders and the bureaucracy in these countries is that the development needs of these countries meant that political leaders sought political and economic transformation of the country. The colonially established civil services, however,
were unresponsive to such demands because they were concerned more with following procedure and maintain the status quo in these societies (Dwivedi, 1999; Brett, 2009 ). As Hirschmann (1999: 291) notes, the bureaucratic elites in these countries turned out to be 'rather conservative and process-oriented, and very defensive about the possibility of losing their economic security and social status in a fragile political situation.' 6 However, it is important to note that tensions between politicians and bureaucrats in these countries may also arise because political elites undermine civil service procedures for rent-seeking purposes.
Competitive elections are also an important feature of many countries with intrusive political-bureaucratic relations. 7 This tends to mean that politicians have much shorter tenures than career civil servants, which provides greater incentives for bureaucrats to obstruct political mandates as those issuing these mandates may only be in power until the next election. Often, a breakdown in political-bureaucratic relations is linked to political change. After a period of one-party domination, there may be a lack of trust between new political leaders and the bureaucracy because the bureaucracy is associated with the previous regime (Everest-Phillips, 2013) . Furthermore, the more open nature of political systems in many of these countries means that additional actors, such as elite classes, unions, civil society, and donors, influence policymaking and political-bureaucratic interactions.
Integrated Model
The integrated model of political-bureaucratic relations is characterized by clear role separation between politicians and bureaucrats, and high bureaucratic autonomy. This model is associated with advanced democracies, such as the UK and the USA, which have strong political institutions. There are several key characteristics:
 Clear separation of roles and hierarchy between politicians and bureaucrats.
 Primary responsibility of bureaucrats is to advise political leaders and implement decisions made by these leaders.
 Rule-of-law based politically neutral civil service.
 Meritocratic recruitment and promotion in the bureaucracy.
These characteristics are generally in line with the Weberian ideal, which tends to be the normative ideal in Western societies characterized by an integrated model, rather than necessarily being the reality of political-administrative relations (Hansen and Ejersbo, 2002) . Bureaucracies in many advanced democracies are actually far more politicized than the Weberian ideal, and the separation of political and administrative roles may at times be unclear (Svara, 2006) .
As such, it is important to note that there are significant differences in politicalbureaucratic relations among countries characterized by the integrated model. Indeed, Svara (2006) differentiates between countries within this group according to differences in role separation and bureaucratic autonomy. The key point, though, is that while there may be differences among countries within the integrated model, the within-group differences are substantially lower than differences with countries that have other political-administrative models. For example, while the USA may have a higher proportion of political appointments in the bureaucracy than the UK, in both countries the bureaucracy is broadly based on principles of merit and political neutrality. This differs considerably from countries in the collusive model where appointment based on political loyalty is institutionalized (Grindle, 2012) .
TRANSFORMING POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS
In considering models of political-bureaucratic relations in developing countries, an important question that arises is how do states move from one model of politicalbureaucratic relations to another? Governance reforms promoted by donors in recent decades have, to a significant degree, attempted to transform the relationship between politicians and civil servants. These efforts, however, have frequently ended in failure, demonstrating the need to better understand how change happens.
8 It is worth noting that the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) based reforms in a number of advanced democracies has changed the relationship between politicians and administrators considerably. A detailed discussion of these changes is beyond the scope of this paper. However, broadly-speaking, these reforms have led to a more market contract-like relationship between ministers -the purchasers of goods and services -and ministries and other public or private entities -the suppliers of goods and services (Schick, 1998) . It is also worth noting that some argue NPM is being replaced in some developed democracies by information technology centred governance (see Dunleavy et al., 2005) .
All states have at some point in time had public services based on patronage systems with collusive political-bureaucratic relations. A number of scholars, most notably Grindle (2012) , have examined how countries have gone from having patronage systems to merit-based civil service systems considering historic and contemporary cases. In most cases change occurred as a result of political entrepreneurs working strategically with like-minded reformists to bring civil service reform. The way this change was introduced varied across different contexts. In some countries it was through top-down initiatives from political leaders, in others it was the result of elite settlements, or competition among political parties. Even after reforms were adopted, patronage often continued, and so ensuring reforms were implemented required further strategic political action in the post-reform period. Therefore, in most cases change occurred 'slowly and gradually' (Grindle, 2012: 9) .
Most donor-promoted governance reforms have sought to move countries to the integrated model of political-bureaucratic relations, often bringing in aspects of general management theories, based on the New Public Management (NPM) approach. While the aim of bringing widespread private sector managerial practices into the public sector has influenced governments across the globe, its effects have often been questioned (Pollit, 2006; Dunleavy and Hood, 2009) . One reason that such efforts have produced disappointing results is because they failed to consider the limitations of markets and the private sectors in these countries. Following independence, the absence of a strong domestic private sector in most countries meant the bureaucracy was the main instrument of economic development (Hirschmann, 1999) . This also meant the bureaucracy became the major source of employment in many developing countries. Therefore, change in the nature of political-bureaucratic relations is linked to the relative strength of the private sector. As Schick (1998: 129) points out, 'progress in the public sector requires parallel advances in the market
This is demonstrated in the case of developmental states with collaborative politicalbureaucratic relations. The development success of these countries is linked to the success of the political leadership and key economic ministries in implementing policies that strengthened the private sector in these countries (Wade, 1990 ).
Furthermore, in many developmental contexts, such as Japan and China, political leaders sought to incentivize bureaucrats to implement strategies to strengthen the private sector by allowing senior bureaucrats to retire early and join the private sector (Johnson, 1982; Li, 1998) . The development of a strong private sector has also led to change in political-bureaucratic relations. Effectively, it has meant that the bureaucracy is no longer needed to be driver of economic development, and as such the process of development has meant that these states, particularly those in East Asia, have moved from collaborative relations towards the integrated model (Cheung, 2005) .
It is important to note that there are limitations associated with the collaborative model. The close relationship between political and bureaucratic elites has meant that corruption has been a major issue (Evans, 1992; Kang, 2002) . Furthermore, while there are examples of democratic developmental states, most have been autocratic, which has meant the public has had little voice in the policy process, and political opposition has often been suppressed (Leftwich, 1995) . Perhaps the most important lesson is that change occurs slowly and gradually, and the trajectory of change varies significantly, depending on specific country contexts. Therefore, it is important to move away from trying to move countries to an integrated model using extensive reforms implemented quickly, towards better understanding how gradual and incremental changes in the politics-bureaucracy interface can better enable politicians and bureaucrats to respond to the development requirements of a specific context.
Building this understanding requires further research on specific parts of the politicsbureaucracy interface in developing countries.
In looking at how the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in a country may change, it is worth considering the principal factors shaping the politicalbureaucratic relationship in developing countries. These issues shed light on differences across political-bureaucratic models and what the sources of change or continuity in particular political-bureaucratic relationship may be. A wide range of context-specific factors will influence the nature of political-bureaucratic engagement in a given country; however, drawing on empirical analyses of governance and reform processes in poorer nations (e.g. Evans 1992; Tendler 1997; Hirschmann, 1999; Grindle, 2004; 2012; Melo et al., 2012; Levy, 2014) , we identify four issues that consistently influence political-bureaucratic relations. These are a) resources; b) recruitment and career progression; c) representativeness; and d) values, interests and motivations.
Resources
Political-bureaucratic interactions are strongly influenced by the resources that each set of officials can draw on. By resources, we refer to the sources of power available to politicians and bureaucrats that enable each to influence decision-making. Hirschmann (1999: 289) argues development organizations often overlook the influence bureaucrats have on development programmes because they fail to consider the resources the bureaucracy has at its disposal, such as 'legal authority and informal administrative power based on relative expertise, permanency and influence over policy formulation and implementation.' There are three main types of resource:
institutional, informational, and financial.
A country's political institutions allocate power and position to political and bureaucratic elites, providing the framework for interactions, determining the representation of interests in the decision-making process, and establishing the rules and norms by which political and bureaucratic spheres are governed. Political institutions establish a hierarchy between politicians and bureaucrats, with the former holding the overall decision-making authority. Political leaders can ignore the advice of bureaucrats, and often have the power to appoint and remove administrators, as
Ayee (2013) The second type of resource that is seen to shape the politics-bureaucracy relationship is informational resources, which broadly refers to knowledge and expertise about different aspects of the political and policymaking process. The information asymmetry between politicians and bureaucrats that arises from bureaucratic expertise has been the subject of considerable academic attention (see Moe, 2006) . As Weber (1968) explained, expertise represents the principal source of power for bureaucracies, and can be at the root of conflict between politicians and bureaucratsa conflict between hierarchy and expertise. This is especially so in developing 9 Although as Eaton (2000) points out, the autonomy of bureaucrats is not uniform across different parliamentary and presidential systems. The third resource influencing political-bureaucratic relations is financial resources. This is control over material resources between politicians and bureaucrats. In general,
11 It is worth noting that the extent to which expertise provides bureaucrats influence is likely to vary across different sectors. 12 Studies have, however, argued that differences in levels of bureaucratic expertise within countries leads to different political-bureaucratic relations across difference ministries within a country (e.g. Costello 1996).
political leaders' greater control over a country's resources ensures greater responsiveness by bureaucrats to their demands.
Ministries and agencies that have access to external funds are likely to have greater autonomy from political leaders than those entirely dependent on the central government for funding. 13 As such, aid provided to specific ministries may redress power imbalances in the politics-bureaucracy relationship. However, there are significant limitations to such external funding, particularly as there is danger of donor-funded agencies becoming more accountable to external donors than to citizens and elected officials (Hirschmann, 1999) .
Recruitment and Career Progression
Meritocratic recruitment and career progression is a central feature of Weber's ideal type bureaucracy. It is a key factor distinguishing developmental states, which tend to have meritocratic bureaucracies, from patrimonial states, where bureaucratic recruitment and promotions are almost always based on personalized ties (Evans, 1992; Leftwich, 1995; Grindle, 2012) . The absence of meritocratic recruitment in the bureaucracy is associated with producing public administrations that are inflated, inefficient, corrupt, and lacking in autonomy from political leaders. It is the absence of meritocratic recruitment in many developing countries that is the most prominent feature of a collusive model of political-administrative relations.
A principal means of ensuring meritocratic recruitment in the bureaucracy is through a civil service entrance examination. This entrance exam, together with the prestige associated with employment in the civil service, enabled developmental regimes to recruit the countries' best graduates (Evans, 1992) . This is a key factor in the high levels of bureaucratic autonomy and influence in policymaking. In contrast, many states, particularly in Latin America, have tended not to have formal civil service entrance exams (Grindle, 2012; Parrado and Salvador, 2011) . Instead most positions in the bureaucracy are 'assigned on the basis of political affiliation, social class, ethnic group, nepotism or family connections' (Meacham, 1999: 282) . This, in turn, is linked to a lack of bureaucratic autonomy.
Having civil service exams, however, does not necessarily ensure that recruitment into the bureaucracy is meritocratic. As Evans and Raunch (2000: 53) note, 'exams and other credentials may not select for relevant skills but instead may function mainly as barriers to entry that shield incumbent officials from competition from qualified outsiders.' Furthermore, there may be some conflict between achieving more representative bureaucracy and seeking to achieve meritocracy through civil service exams (see below).
In addition to recruitment being meritocratic, it is also important that career progression in the bureaucracy is based on performance rather than political loyalty. This is a crucial area where political interference can restrict bureaucratic autonomy, and tends to be a central characteristic of intrusive political-bureaucratic relations (Ayee, 2013). In India, for example, civil servants are provided constitutional protection against unfair dismissal by ministers, and so the main way politicians assert their control over the bureaucracy is by assigning and transferring civil servants to posts of varying importance, often based on caste affinity (Iyer and Mani, 2012) .
While the extent to which positions in the bureaucracy are filled by political appointment tends to be associated with political control over the bureaucracy, political appointments are not necessarily made on the basis of political loyalty (Everest-Phillips, 2013) . Recent analyses of successful reforms in developing countries show that political appointments can be important for reform success where there is bureaucratic resistance to change or where there is a lack of expertise on a specific policy area within the bureaucracy (Grindle, 2004; Melo et al., 2012) . In such cases, political appointments can help to produce more collaborative politicalbureaucratic relations around a reform process.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that recent decades have seen the expansion of educational programs in public administration and public policy, which have been geared towards promoting more meritocratic bureaucracies (Hajnal, 2003) . While these formative activities initially took place in Western countries, they have rapidly been adopted by many developing countries (Sabharwal and Berman, 2013) . Despite this trend, little is known about how these programs have affected the performance of public servants (Newcomer, Allen and Baradei, 2010; Lewis, 1987) .
Representation
A key issue shaping and reflecting political-bureaucratic relations is representationespecially representation in the bureaucracy. The issue of representation is not exclusive to developing countries; within political science research more generally there has been much focus on the extent to which bureaucracies should reflect the interests, views, needs, goals and values of the general public in the policy process (Pitkin, 1967; Keiser et al., 2002) . However, the issue of representative bureaucracy is arguably of more consequence in developing countries, where weak political institutions combined with ethnic divisions can hinder development and increase the risk of violent conflict (Stewart, 2000) .
Much of the focus on the issue of representative bureaucracy has considered the extent to which ensuring a demographic group is represented in the makeup of a country's bureaucracy fosters a decision-making process that benefits the group through removing discriminatory boundaries (Mosher, 1982) . Research on bureaucratic representativeness, both in terms of ethnicity and gender, has generally found that there is little to suggest that greater numerical representative in the bureaucracy impacts policy outcomes (Subramaniam, 1967; Dresang, 1974; Goetz, 1998; Burnet, 2008) . Politicians in countries divided along ethnic lines may use employment in the bureaucracy as a means of asserting their control -both over the bureaucracy and over politics in the country more generally. In Trinidad and Guyana, for example, ethnic divisions in politics have meant that employment in the public sector is dependent on which ethnic group happened to be in power, which is found to negatively impact public sector performance (Brown, 1999) . The consequences of political influence over civil service employment along ethnic lines can have more damaging consequences. Indeed, it is seen as a core component of 'horizontal inequalities' -inequalities between culturally formed groups -and is associated with more risk of violent conflict, as has been the case in Rwanda and Sri Lanka in the 1990s (Stewart, 2000; Uvin, 1998) . Hence, issues of representation can be an underlying factor in producing more intrusive relations between politicians and administrators.
As such, while there has been some debate over whether seeking to ensure a bureaucracy is representative on the basis of ethnicity can undermine the development of a meritocratic and autonomous bureaucracy, ethnic representation in the bureaucracy has been an important part of state-building in newly independent nations (Enloe, 1978) . Indeed, the development success of countries such as Botswana and
Mauritius is seen in part as being due to developing a 'politically independent state bureaucracy with personnel policies based largely on merit, but with a composition that is reasonably representative of their societies ' (Carroll and Carroll, 1997: 470) .
Values, interests and motivations
The relationship between political and bureaucratic elites shapes, and is shaped by, the values, interests and motivations of each set of actor. Detailed analysis of motivations of government elites has been an area of neglect in development research and policy, as the mainstream development community has been 'guided by an almost religious belief in self-interest as an explanation for human behavior' (Tendler, 1997: 5) . This emphasis on self-interest has meant that there is relatively little research that directly examines the role of values and how values and interests influence public attitudes and motivations in developing countries.
In contrast, the desire to help society and its citizens (Perry and Wise, 1990) has been a key area of research in the field of public administration (Bozeman and Su, 2015) .
Interest in public service motivation has, in fact, been growing over the past decade, in part because 'researchers have long shown how important unselfish motivational components like loyalty, identification, and good-spirited cooperation are in overcoming collective action problems, such as free-riding, moral hazards, and opportunism' (Vandenabeele et al., 2014: 780) . Yet, while public sector motivation was initially observed among politicians, it was soon argued that this subset of values and attitudes towards the common good was not unique among politicians, nor among public servants. Instead, it was a motivational disposition that could be found in any individual, regarding their country of origin or the working sector (Brewer and Selden, 1998; Wise, 2000) .
Arguably, one of the most important questions that future research on governance in development needs to consider is how and why is there an esprit de corps among and bureaucrats (Turner and Hulme, 1997) .
Another background factor emphasized in the literature on developmental states, such as Japan and South Korea, is the informal networks that were created at elite universities and secondary schools, which political and bureaucratic elites attended, which help to promote collaborative relations. (Evans, 1992) . 14 A more recent study
by Jones et al. (2014) demonstrates how the key reform coalitions in Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s emerged from student organizations and study groups at the University of Ghana in the 1970s and early 1980s. In contrast, informal networks based on kin, ethnicity, or region, is seen to have prevented the formation of a development-oriented ethos among politicians and bureaucrats in many countries.
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The formation of an esprit de corps between political and bureaucratic elites is not exclusively shaped by such background factors. In many cases, it is the result of political action. Political leadership is crucial for avoiding widespread corruption in the bureaucracy; where the political leadership is corrupt it is almost inevitable that the bureaucracy will be afflicted by systematic corruption (Dwivedi et al., 1989; Hyden et al., 2003) . The importance of political leadership goes beyond avoiding corruption. Studies on developmental states, such as Singapore, emphasize the way in which political leaders actively sought to promote values based on public service, nation-building, and development in the bureaucracy (Saxena, 2011) . This was done in a number of ways, such as setting up civil service education centers and encouraging bureaucrats to participate in civic projects.
Other political and development factors are also important. For example, political continuity in developmental states -either due to the country being autocratic or because one political party continually won national elections -helped to develop shared values and objectives over a long period of time (Leftwich, 1995) . However, this is true of party-based rather than personalistic regimes. In personalistic systems, such as Zimbabwe, continuity has typically led to more collusive and predatory system. Political ideology is another important factor. Tensions can arise between politicians and bureaucrats due to differences in political ideology, as Costello (1996) discusses in the case of Tanzania. In many developmental states, political leaders avoided framing reforms on the basis of left-right political spectrum, and instead emphasized a pragmatic developmental ideology. This is also noted in studies of successful reforms in developing countries (Melo et al., 2012) . In many contexts, this economic success reinforced an 'ideology of developmentalism' among the political and bureaucratic elites, as Charlton (1991) explains in the Botswana case.
There are also organizational and individual level factors that can shape motivations among politicians and bureaucrats, and the creation of a shared developmental ethos.
Public policy studies suggest that a key determinant of bureaucratic motivations is the characteristics of the specific ministry or agency a bureaucrat works for (Dunleavy, 1991) . Individual level factors linked to organizational characteristics are also important, including career progression, influence and wage levels, which impact motivations and performance.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The significant academic research on political-administrative relations has tended to focus almost exclusively on wealthy institutionalized democracies. There has been an absence of attention given to how the nature of political-bureaucratic relations in developing countries, and how these might shape the development process. Yet the way politicians and bureaucrats engage with one another is increasingly recognized as a key area for understanding the politics and governance of reform in developing countries. The lack of attention to this issue has meant that much of our understanding of the politics-bureaucracy relationship in these countries is based on the relationship observed in advanced democracies. This ignores the significant differences between richer and poorer nations in terms of institutional development and governance structures. As a result, development policy has too often taken a 'best practice' approach to governance (Andrews, 2012) , where donors and other development organizations have sought to address the failure to improve public services and development outcomes by trying to transfer governance institutions from developed nations to developing country contexts (Andrews, 2013; Levy, 2014) . The failure of efforts at wholesale governance reform has spurned much of the recent literature on reforms in developing countries and, more generally, has prompted the recent 'political turn' in development research and policy (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013; Hudson and Dasandi, 2014) .
This paper brings together this work in a broad framework to provide the basis for more systematic research on the politics-bureaucracy interface in development. In doing so, the paper has offered two contributions. First, we have discussed a typology of political-bureaucratic relations. Specifically, we draw on the concepts of separation and autonomy (Svara, 2006) to analyze the main different types of relations that politicians and bureaucrats can have. According to this, we have outlined four models of political-bureaucratic relations: collaborative, collusive, intrusive, and integrated. We have also analyzed the main characteristics of each model, and provided an overview of how change occurs in these types of relations.
Second, it has identified the key factors associated with the political-bureaucratic interface in a development context. These factors are resources; recruitment and career progression; representativeness; and values, interests and motivations.
We have elaborated different models of political-bureaucratic relations in developing countries. We have not, however, provided a detailed analysis of these models in specific country cases, or examined in any detail the link between specific models of political-administrative relations and development outcomes. As such, there are several key avenues of future research that follow from this paper. One area is a greater focus on comparative analysis, as much of the existing research on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is country specific. Another important area of future research is how political-bureaucratic relations can change and what the drivers of this change are. This paper offers the basis for such future research, and provides an entry point for scholars and development policymakers to better understanding the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in developing countries. 
